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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Secretary

85- 4544

15 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

1. This is the fifth and final report in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet actions leading up to the summit. It provides sections on Soviet overt propaganda and political influence efforts [redacted] and Soviet instructions to their missions abroad. [redacted]

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SUMMARY

2. The daily plethora of Soviet pre-summit propaganda has continued to focus on arms control, SDI, and reactions to statements by the President and other US officials. The allegations surrounding the re-defection of Yurchenko and other purported human rights infringements have also received Soviet media attention. Unofficial information communicated to the United States on the fate of Soviet human rights "celebrities" seems to have been carefully separated from official Soviet commitments. Because most of the "gestures" reportedly underway appear to be scheduled after the summit, it is possible they may be withdrawn if the summit doesn't go as expected. [redacted]

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[redacted] Gorbachev may remain in Geneva several days after the summit, apparently to counterbalance the President's West European agenda after the meeting. [redacted]

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[redacted] Finally, it appears Soviet missions in West Europe in the closing weeks were instructed to take a low profile on summit issues. [redacted]

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SDI and Arms Control

3. General Secretary Gorbachev continues to play a prominent role in Moscow's final propaganda push. His letter-writing campaign continued this month with an open response to a joint letter from six government leaders in which he expresses his views on the summit, the arms race, and the prevention of the militarization of space. Gorbachev also wrote a "secret" letter to FRG Chancellor Kohl, part of which was obtained and published by the West German

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Bild on 2 and 4 November. The letter, a response to an earlier letter by Kohl, attempted to explain Moscow's views on US and West German positions regarding SDI. It conveyed warnings to Kohl against participation in SDI, commented on Soviet initiatives in Geneva, and proposed action to reduce intermediate range missile forces in Europe. The letter paralleled Soviet media attacks in late October which charged military-industrial circles in the FRG with launching a propaganda campaign aimed at justifying Bonn's official support for the US "Star Wars" plan.

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4. In another forum -- at a dinner for visiting Ethiopian President Mengistu -- Gorbachev blamed US attempts to upset the military-strategic balance as the source of current international tensions. Gorbachev reiterated that the Soviet position at Geneva will seek to prevent the militarization of space and achieve mutual arms reductions with the United States.

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5. In addition, in a series of articles prepared in response to recent US statements, Soviet media alleged that:

- Reagan's push for SDI is inevitably intended to provide the United States with a first strike capability;
- US leaders have begun to downplay the public's hopes connected with the Geneva meeting;
- the United States is responsible for disrupting normal US-Soviet relations;
- the US position on the issue of resolving regional conflicts is hypocritical; and
- the huge US military budget is fueling the arms race and is poisoning the atmosphere for the Geneva summit.

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6. Other recent Soviet press reports, primarily directed at Western European audiences, have called attention to US and NATO ship operations in the Baltic on the eve of the summit. The reports, in particular, cited the positioning of USS IOWA, the presence of nuclear arms on US warships, and the "Baltops 85" NATO exercise, which allegedly pose a threat to the "socialist" countries and Warsaw Pact security.

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7. In a 29 October story datelined Tokyo, a Soviet party official, in an interview with a Japanese new agency, reportedly expressed Soviet preparedness to negotiate SS-20 numbers in Siberia if the United States were prepared to reduce its weapons systems in Asia and the Pacific. According to this official, Soviet concerns were caused in part by US basing on Honshu of F-16s -- identified by the Soviets as strategic systems.

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8. In recent private conversations, comments made to US embassy officials in Moscow by mid-level Soviet political observers have mirrored a number of the representations that Soviet diplomats have also made to the Western press. In the private conversations, the Soviets stressed that:

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- economic pressures are behind the Soviet interest in arms control;
- the summit could appear to sanction aggressive American policies if it fails to make progress in arms control;
- there is little ground for optimism at the summit; and
- Moscow may have to wait out the present US administration in order to begin serious negotiations.

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Human Rights Issues

9. With respect to human rights issues, the Soviets continue to allege that the United States is a significant violator of human rights worldwide, while continuing to signal a willingness to make concessions on highly visible dissident cases.

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10. The Soviet media have used Yurchenko's return to the Soviet Union as a case exemplifying US "illegal" activities and manifesting state terrorism. On 9 November Pravda described Yurchenko as a Soviet diplomat on a mission in Italy who was "forcibly kidnapped by persons unknown and taken across the ocean having been rendered unconscious by powerful drugs." In a clear effort to link the event to US human rights violations, Pravda exclaimed that this was an "utterly gross flouting of the elementary norms of human morality and international law."

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11. Similarly, in their efforts to exploit the situation in South Africa, TASS -- in conjunction with a report issued by the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid in late October -- condemned the United States and its closest allies for its alleged policy of broadening military-political support for the racist regime of South Africa.

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12. Conversely, on 1 November, a Soviet journalist privately told a US embassy official in Moscow that the Soviets may grant "amnesty" to Shcharanskiy and permit him and others, including Ida Nudel, to leave the Soviet Union by the end of November. The information, which was probably intended for Western use, reportedly came from a Central Committee meeting, and suggests that Gorbachev intends to make the humanitarian gesture to President Reagan before the summit to sweeten the atmosphere. The report was similar to one from another Soviet journalist received by the embassy several days earlier. A 12 November US Embassy report from Moscow indicates that rumors are circulating about Shcharanskiy's impending release.

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13. The recent disclosures through the Western press and private conversations with US officials on the fate of Soviet human rights "celebrities" show a careful separation of those disclosures from official Soviet commitment. Although these disclosures appear to have the sanction of the government, and suggest a Soviet desire to be accommodating on human rights for the summit, they can be plausibly denied. In any event, no releases or visas are expected before the summit. If the Soviets are not satisfied with the summit results, they can deny the stories, delay any exit

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visas, and blame the United States for creating false hopes or other impediments. If, on the other hand, the Soviets see an advantage to the release of dissidents, they can claim credit, having already set the stage.

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Front Group and Conference Activities

14. In a turnabout to the usual rubber-stamp operation of front group gatherings, pacifist organization representatives at an October World Peace Council-sponsored meeting in Helsinki refused to approve a Soviet-sponsored resolution to support Soviet arms reduction offers and condemn the SDI.

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15. But elsewhere the Soviet-controlled fronts performed predictably. During the 24-27 October Sydney International Peace Conference for Pacific and Asian Regions, organized by the Australian Peace Committee, an affiliate of the World Peace Council, attendees pursued several anti-American themes:

- star wars must be stopped;
- the United States is developing a first strike capability;
- the United States is responsible for the threat of nuclear holocaust; and;
- the United States is using Japan as a first-strike base against the USSR.

No one questioned Moscow's arms control or defense policies: their policies were presented as coinciding with those of the peace movement.

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16. In an attempt to influence the second world conference of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, encompassing 137 national societies, the Soviet vice president of the League reported in an interview with Izvestiya on Soviet proposals at the conference aimed at preventing nuclear war, ending the arms race, and the Soviet plan to conduct a campaign of peace. The proposals, however, met with resistance from US and other Western delegates.

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17. During the period 31 October to 3 November, the West German section of International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War, sponsored the Fifth Medical Congress for the Prevention of Nuclear War. According to TASS, the Congress praised Soviet peace initiatives, such as the Soviet Union's decision to stop unilaterally all nuclear explosions, and condemned SDI. According to the West German Allgemeine Zeitung, 2000 of the participants held a demonstration in Wiesbaden on 2 November to protest the number of military installations in that region. The paper reported that the Congress ended with the demand for a stop to the development and testing of new nuclear weapons.

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18. As an apparent disinformation ploy to evoke pre-summit sympathy, three Soviet government officials separately confided to a US citizen that Gorbachev is making numerous enemies among the conservative bureaucracy because of his "liberal" economic programs, and might eventually be the target for an assassination attempt or a coup. [REDACTED]

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Summit

22. The major Soviet propaganda activity on the eve of the summit appears to be a leftist demonstration planned for 16 Novmeber in Geneva.

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supported. During the week of 9 November, activists were in Geneva passing out leaflets advertising the demonstration. In addition to the planned afternoon demonstration, the leaflets call for participation in a "friendship festival" at the university that same evening and for contributions to support both activities in care of the Peace Committee of Geneva.

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23. The Soviets are also preparing a campaign for the western press at the Press Center in Geneva. The main briefings on the summit will be given there Leonid Zamyatin, the official spokesman for Gorbachev. Several well-

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

1 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

1. This is the fourth report in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet actions leading up to the summit.

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SUMMARY

2. The Soviets continue their campaign of fostering expectations of substantive arms control agreements to be reached at the November meeting. [redacted] activities in the last two weeks have continued to criticize the US Administration's preparations for the meeting, including the President's UN speech and recent announcement of a new US proposal, in the hopes of having the US public and its policymakers--as well its Allies--press for US concessions. Soviet influence activities continue, with diplomatic and private communications, conferences, demonstrations, front group pressures, and a worldwide propaganda campaign.

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Soviet Media on the Summit

3. The initial TASS reaction to President Reagan's press conference statement announcing the new US proposal to be presented at Geneva was negative. Proposal details provided to the US press were described as a "leak of an organized and purposeful character."

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4. The Soviet media continues to accuse the US Administration of an offhand approach toward the upcoming meeting. At the same time, Moscow seeks to highlight the differences that may exist between the US Administration and other influential bodies in the US as well as abroad. For example, the Soviet press states that Moscow's proposals have "evoked a positive response from many prominent politicians and public figures in different countries, members of their governments and parliaments, and members of the anti-war movement." Even in Washington a "certain shift" has been observed, where Soviet proposals

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are "no longer dismissed out of hand as another propaganda exercise," and where "sensible, realistic ideas" are maturing in "US public and political, including congressional, circles." [REDACTED]

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5. The Soviet press alleges that, as the US-Soviet summit meeting approaches, "the wheels of the White House political and propaganda machine" are turning faster. Soviet press statements typically maintain that the unspecificity of the US positions makes the questions of concessions regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and reciprocal and equal arms reductions difficult. In the Soviet view, "it is unreasonable to delay until the last moment, since the positions of the sides need to be agreed in advance if the summit meeting is to be as productive as possible." In the Soviet press, President Reagan is urged to make "honest, frank, and unambiguous presentations of positions," to "abandon the constant demonstrations of a 'tough line', 'inflexibility', and 'ability to bargain'," and to adopt instead a "constructive tone if, of course, the President is truly prepared for agreements." [REDACTED]

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6. The Soviets have also continued their efforts to highlight what they claim to be a broad worldwide support for their proposals. For example, on 26 October, Yuriy A. Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, made a TV presentation which showed friendly interviews with leading West German figures. Zhukov reiterated that the Soviet Union "is going to Geneva with a well elaborated and constructive program of action which opens up a path toward accord. But from Washington we have so far heard no constructive proposals, and the speech that President Reagan delivered...in the United Nations once again gives rise to alarm in the minds and hearts of the peace supporters." [REDACTED]

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7. In an additional attempt to propagandize their positions, the Soviets printed in The Washington Post on 25 October a statement by Marshal Akhromeyev attacking US positions on arms control, and the current analysis of the ABM Treaty and SDI in particular, accusing the US of showing no signs of "businesslike and constructive preparations" for the Geneva meeting. This article was a translation of its Russian version published in Pravda on 19 October. Akhromeyev's article developed in a more authoritative and in a harsher tone the arguments put forward in Krasnaya zvezda on 11 and 19 October by Col. Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS reviewer on military matters. [REDACTED]

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Peace Demonstrations

8. The Soviets have tried to capitalize on the recent award of the Nobel Prize to the International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) to popularize Soviet positions. [REDACTED]

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9. Copenhagen was the scene last week of the latest in a series of peace demonstrations in Scandanavian cities. The demonstration drew 30,000 participants in response to the theme "Scandnavia as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone." [REDACTED]

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Leaks on Human Rights

10. The Soviets initially used "leaks" to lessen public pressure on human rights issues.

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International Conferences

11. The Soviets have used a number of meetings, conferences, and other events to press their attacks on SDI and US arms control positions. Moscow

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12. Earlier this month General Secretary Gorbachev personally addressed disarmament issues through messages to the Soviet front, World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Moscow, and to the Club of Rome, an international environmental organization.

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13. A two-day roundtable conference of Soviet and Japanese journalists, held in Tokyo last week, produced expressions of concern over plans to "militarize outer space" and the danger of nuclear war.

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14. During the Socialist International Consultative Council on Disarmament, held in mid-October in Vienna, many attendees--according to TASS--called on the United States to respond to Soviet arms reduction proposals and to prevent the "militarization of space." The importance Moscow placed on the forum was reflected by the participation of Boris Ponomarev, head of the CPSU International Department.

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Soviet Reaction to the President's UN Speech

16. Soviet Bloc statements on the President's UN speech have been negative, maintaining that the "main focus of the speech was in no way one of the most burning problems of nuclear disarmament, but on other issues." President Reagan's proposal for the settlement of regional conflicts was

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viewed "essentially as an attempt to attain international legislation for its acts of international banditry on a par with their inglorious incursion and occupation of Grenada. Washington, as demonstrated by the President's speech, has no intention of renouncing this policy."

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17. In discussing the speech, Vitaliy Kobyshev, Chief of the US Sector of the CPSU International Information Department, bluntly stated on 26 October that the "Soviet Union is willing to discuss regional conflicts, the more so in view of the fact that the neutralization of these conflicts and the ending of bloodshed does indeed depend upon the United States with its course of state terrorism and imperialist interference in the internal affairs of other people." He rejected what he saw as the President's effort to draw public attention away from the main issues, stating that "on the eve of the Geneva summit meeting the world public expects not diplomatic games and propaganda tricks, but a demonstration of a serious and responsible approach to the solution of the fundamental problems of the present day."

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UN Lobbying

18. The Soviets used the UN General Assembly to reiterate their views to various foreign leaders in attendance. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told West German Chancellor Kohl that the US was seeking superiority over the Soviet Union and thus "playing with fire" because the Soviets would never allow themselves to become a second-rate power. Shevardnadze asserted that the central issue for the US-Soviet summit was security and arms control, and that the United States was trying to relegate it to the sidelines by bringing up subsidiary issues such as regional and human rights questions. Shevardnadze also took the opportunity to meet with representatives of friendly governments, such as the Vice President of North Korea and the Indian Minister for External Affairs, with whom he issued a statement opposing "the militarization of outer space."

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William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D.C. 20505

10 OCT 1985

OLL 85-2865/1

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Returned herewith, per your request of 6 August 1985, is the sanitized transcript of the 12 September 1985 hearing on Soviet Active Measures before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Distribution:

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1 - DCI

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

18 OCT 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

1. Herewith is the third report in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet actions leading up to the November summit. It incorporates changes in format and expands the subject matter beyond active measures as requested by your staff. Included you will find intelligence material, for your background, that addresses the Soviet pre-summit line and principal negotiating issues, as well as evidence of Soviet efforts to use propaganda, front groups and other tactics to posture themselves for several possible summit outcomes. [REDACTED]

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2. Since tabling their formal arms control proposals at Geneva early this month, the Soviets have floated several subsequent informal proposals--some at Geneva, and some through visiting Soviet officials in the United States--which hint at willingness to back away from some of their earlier stands. It is not yet clear what status these recent hints have, or to what extent they portend real flexibility. Except for these ploys, we have not discerned, during the last two weeks, any tactical shifts in Soviet active measures targeted for the November meeting in Geneva. Soviet activities continue to seek to create a favorable atmosphere for Moscow by running an extensive propaganda campaign, announcing a series of public arms control initiatives, and attempting publicly and privately to have West European leaders and publics pressure the US to make concessions. [REDACTED]

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Background

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25X1Political Influence Activities[REDACTED]
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8. The main theme of Soviet [REDACTED] activities related to the November meeting has been the allegation that the US administration is opposed to progress in arms control and improved US-Soviet relations. In this context, SDI has become the main target of Soviet attacks. Although the Soviets are clearly concerned about the capabilities of the system envisioned by SDI, they have at the same time exploited the SDI concept in various covert and overt actions seeking to influence the November meeting and beyond. As the focal point of these Soviet efforts, the SDI issue is used by Moscow to rekindle West European opposition to US defense plans, by trying to prove that the US is militaristic, is seeking a first-strike capability, and is unwilling to decrease international tensions. [REDACTED]

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9. Disinformation activities are presently geared toward heightening public expectations for major results from the November meeting between President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev. The Soviets probably calculate that in the absence of significant US concessions at Geneva, they can blame the US for the lack of agreement and subsequently step up propaganda and other activities further to fuel the broader anti-SDI campaign. [REDACTED]

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19. [redacted] there is a widely-held view that for the first time the USSR has taken the offensive in presenting proposals. While the Soviet proposals have been criticized in the US media, the fact remains that they were not rejected by the Reagan Administration. It is thought by the Soviets that the Administration is carefully studying the proposals. They do not represent the last word from the Soviet Union and much will depend on the response of the United States to these proposals.

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William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

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Central Intelligence Agency

85-0393/3



09 OCT 1985

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Active Measures

Herewith is the second in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet Active Measures.

Active Measures That Relate to the Summit

1. In its open propaganda, the Soviet Union continues to berate the US for taking the arms race to outer space and for mounting an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. "Krasnaya Zvezda" for 26 September 1985 published an article charging that "The White House is stubbornly trying to attribute its own sins to the Soviet Union" and that the US has an unconstructive and "not quite honest" approach to the November meeting between President Reagan and Gorbachev. Another authoritative article charges the President with pursuing "the aim of justifying refusal to conclude an accord with the USSR at the forthcoming summit." A recurring theme charges US failure to respond to peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union. If there is no summit or if it fails to measure up to public expectations, a large body of world opinion will have been well coached to blame the US.

2. Novosti Press Agency has sent hundreds of news items and commentaries from both Soviet and Western media sources to its Latin American offices regarding the upcoming summit meeting. The common theme in these articles is that the US is pressing Latin American nations for debt repayment in order to channel additional funds into arms expenditures at the expense of the already impoverished economies of those nations.

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3. In India, the Novosti office was scheduled to begin a major press and propaganda campaign on 15 September 1985, the objective of which was to project Soviet peace proposals in a favorable light and to mobilize public opinion behind the Soviets during the November meeting between President Reagan and Gorbachev. The "Times of India" for September 28 carried what is probably the beginning of this campaign in an editorial page piece entitled "American Disinformation an Ally in US-Soviet Rivalry." The article is a litany of charges of the United States spreading disinformation on subjects ranging from the Soviet military build-up to genocide against Miskito Indians.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USSR expects no substantive results from the summit meeting. The objective is to obtain a favorable media image of Gorbachev as a flexible and moderate Soviet leader of the new generation who seeks peace, cooperation, and increased East-West contacts. He expects to be portrayed in contrast to an older and dogmatic Reagan. The Soviet strategy is to use the summit to create additional pressures on the US from its European allies.

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Active Measures Which Denigrate the US

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is planned that by October articles and editorials about human rights violations in the West will begin appearing in Soviet newspapers. This counteroffensive is being launched in response to what the Soviets see as a renewed campaign by the United States and other NATO countries to press them harder on the issue of human rights.

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6. A new forgery has been brought to our attention. In early September 1985, an unsigned letter was sent to President Kyprianou of Cyprus. The letter's author presents himself as a British "Foreign and Commonwealth official" who is upset over the fact that the British Government is permitting bases in Cyprus to be used for US actions against Arab countries.

7. The Nigerian press has been carrying articles with undocumented accusations of US dumping nuclear waste material

in Somalia. [REDACTED]

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Also in Nairobi, the "Kenya Times" carried an accusation that the US had provided Kenya with poisonous and spoiled corn. This is similar to charges earlier this year that the United States was sending spoiled food to Ethiopia.

8. In Venezuela, the Soviets have been working through local communist and radical parties to attempt to block the appointment of Otto Reich as the new US Ambassador to Venezuela and damage relations between Venezuela and the US. A contribution to this campaign was made by TASS in a 24 August release titled "Links of the Same Chain," which labeled Reich a "Cuban counterrevolutionary" who is closely linked with the CIA. Denigration of US ambassadors is a common theme in Soviet Active Measures worldwide. Ambassador Dean is the target of a similar campaign in India.

9. [REDACTED]

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/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Active Measures

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Distribution:

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

85-0393/2

20 SEP 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Active Measures

Herewith is the first in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet Active Measures.

In the "Pravda" rendition of his "Time" magazine interview, Gorbachev is quoted as saying: "Moscow is trying to practice restraint in its pronouncements with regard to the United States. It is not resorting to anti-American campaigns nor is it fomenting hatred for your country." An examination of both open Soviet propaganda and recent Soviet Active Measures operations demonstrates this claim to be untrue. Recent anti-American campaigns related to the Summit run and orchestrated by the USSR include:

Active Measures That Relate To The Summit

1. A worldwide effort surrounding the Strategic Defense Initiative is under way. There are regionally geared themes designed to capitalize on local sensitivities. In TASS dispatches to Japan in January and August 1985, as well as in the Soviet newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" in August, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are cited as examples of US irresponsibility in the use of nuclear weapons. The charge was made in the Indian newspaper "Patriot" (well known for its Soviet connections) that the Indian Ocean in general and Diego Garcia in particular would be used by the United States in its SDI program. In

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Europe, the approach has been more sophisticated. In numerous TASS dispatches around the world, the SDI program has been labeled as offensive in nature designed to give the US a first-strike capability. This theme was discussed in "Star Wars: Delusions and Dangers", distributed by Progress Publishers in Moscow in 1985. The Soviet Union has laid the groundwork for walking out of the arms negotiations talks by saying that any arms agreement between the US and the USSR is impossible until the US abandons the SDI program.

2. Personal denigration of US leaders: President Reagan is said to be lost in a world of his own, in a world divorced from reality. It is said that he does not like to study details or engage in analysis; that he does not read books; that he makes one mistake after another, displaying his ignorance, sometimes making outright lies. Defense Secretary Weinberger is labeled a liar on the issue of protests against neutron death. These charges appeared in a Soviet propaganda booklet entitled "Gathering Clouds: Whither Soviet-US Relations?", published by Novosti Press Agency in Moscow in late 1984 and distributed worldwide in thousands of copies in 1985.

Active Measures That Denigrate The US

3. There has been a massive world effort to disprove the "Bulgarian Connection" thesis in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II by shifting blame onto the United States. The magnitude of this effort suggests that a very sensitive nerve has been struck in the Soviet Union by the implication of Soviet involvement. Numerous books and pamphlets have been published which seek to discredit the Bulgarian connection thesis: "The Crime in St. Peter's Square", by Eduard Kovalyov, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1985; "The Assassination Attempt Against the Pope and the Roots of Terrorism", by Ivan Palchev, Sofia Press, Sofia, 1985; "Der Papst und der Morder: die Manipulation des Ali Agca", by Jacques Drescher, Luxembourg, 1985; "The Bulgarian Connection: Accusation without Proof", Sofia Press, Sofia, 1985; "The Conspiracy Against Bulgaria", by the Colombia-Soviet Institute in Bogota, 1985; "John Paul II, Agca, the Connection", by Christian Roulette, 1985; "The Pope-the-Mafia-Agca", by Ugur Mumcu, Ankara, 1984; and "Shots in St. Peter's Square", by Herbert Rechel, West Germany, 1985. Soviet front groups such as the International Association of Democratic Lawyers are also being used to question the legality of putting on trial the Bulgarian who is charged with aiding Agca. Press placement operations are underway around the

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world; and the returned defector Oleg Bitov recently has written a series of articles on the trial for "Literaturnaya Gazeta".

4. The theme of State Terrorism as a United States Government policy is being spread by the Soviet Union worldwide. A book entitled "International Terrorism and the CIA" (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983) deals with this subject at length and continues to be quoted. Recent TASS dispatches have reported that the FBI is running terrorist training camps in the United States, linking this theme to the crash of the Indian airplane, the rash of assassinations in India, and even to the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II.

5. There has also been renewed focus on the charge that KAL 007 was on a spying mission for the United States Government. The Soviet news agency TASS stated that the plane's pilot had deliberately sent wrong data about the altitude of his flight to Japanese air traffic control, "proving that the aircraft's commander knew well that he had crossed the Soviet frontier and that he knew the nature of his mission." This charge was echoed in European newspapers and television reports. There are reports of another edition of a suspected Soviet Active Measures operation book, "The President's Crime", by Akio Takahashi, this time in India where the crash of the Indian airplane near Ireland in June of this year has been linked to the KAL 007 tragedy. This book has appeared previously in Japanese and Russian language editions.

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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August 6, 1985

William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

I appreciate the assistance your Agency has given us in preparing for our hearings this month on Soviet Active Measures. It is my understanding that the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Bob Gates, will be leading your briefing team on September 12. We look forward to his presentation.

In order to ensure prompt, public dissemination of a sanitized version of his remarks in our printed hearings volume, I would ask your help in facilitating the Agency's review of the transcript for that purpose.

Thank you again for your cooperation. With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Senator Richard G. Lugar
Chairman, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee

RGL:chp

cc:Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence



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